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Private Equity Abroad: A Comparative Analysis of Brazil’s Private Equity 
Framework and Europe’s Private Equity Framework 
 
Tyler L. Hinton* 
I. Introduction 
What is the risk?  This question plays a huge roll in every investment decision.  Investors 
often lose sleep thinking about the potential gains or losses associated with a transaction.  
Consequently, investment analysts have deviated from the colloquial meaning of risk, the exposure 
to danger, and view risk as any change, positive or negative, from zero.1  In determining the risk 
of an investment, analysts most commonly use one of three formulas.2  First, Coefficient of 
Variation, which is defined as:  
Coefficient of Variation =  ̄  
Where:  
s = Standard Deviation 
x̄ = Mean3 
 
Investment analysts use the Coefficient of Variation to calculate the risk per unit of return.4  
Accordingly, when comparing the Coefficient of Variation of two investments the investment 
with the lower Coefficient of Variation is regarded as preferable because it presents less risk.5 
The second formula investment analysts use when assessing risk is the Sharpe Ratio, 
which is defined as: 
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1 CFA INSTITUTE, 2017 CFA LEVEL I: PORTFOLIO MGMT. 58 (2017).  
2 Id. at 45. 
3 Id. at 52. 
4 Id. at 63. 




Rx = Expected Portfolio Return 
Rf = Risk Free Rate of Return  
StdDev Rx = Portfolio Standard Deviation6 
 
The Sharpe Ratio measures the risk return per unit of risk.7  Accordingly, when comparing the 
Sharpe Ratio of two investments the investment with the higher Sharpe Ratio is more desirable 
because it indicates a greater return in relation to the level of additional risk taken to incur the 
return.8  
 The last common measure of risk used by investment analysts is the Roy’s Safety First 
Ratio, which is defined as:  




Rx = Expected Portfolio Return 
Rt = Portfolio Target Return  
StdDev Rx = Portfolio Standard Deviation9 
 
Roy’s Safety First Ratio calculates the probability that a portfolio or investment return will fall 
below a minimum threshold over a period of time.10  As such, when investment analysts use the 
Roy’s Safety First Ratio the portfolio or investment with the higher result is selected because it 
indicates a lower probability of a shortfall return.11  
Each of the above formulas seeks to quantify the risk of an investment so investors can 
make important financial decisions with a greater degree of certainty.12  The formulas use statistics 
to best predict the outcome of an investment.13  This is a rational tactic as statistics and investing 
 
6 Id. at 65. 
7 CFA INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 78. 
8 Id. at 72. 
9 Id. at 82. 
10 Id. at 86. 
11 Id. at 88. 
12 Id. at 42. 
13 CFA INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 86. 
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have always gone hand in hand.  The intrinsic relationship between risk assessment and statistics 
presents an interesting challenge to legislators grappling with the question of how to protect 
investors and national markets while simultaneously creating a legal framework that is attractive 
to investors that are inherently risk adverse.  
 The financial crisis gave global regulators new momentum to attempt to regulate 
alternative investment funds.14  This newfound energy and eagerness to regulate came from 
political institutions that villainized alternative investment vehicles.15  Jurisdictions took many 
different approaches in regulating alternative investment vehicles.  Accordingly, the legal 
framework surrounding alternative investment funds is complex and varies dramatically from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Moreover, due to globalization, Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers (hereinafter AIFMs) worldwide seek to diversify the location of their investments with 
the goal of limiting beta risk and achieving returns in excess of the market.16  
Behind the United States, Europe is the second leading location for leveraged buyout 
transactions.17  Private equity funds that concentrate on emerging markets, however, are focusing 
 
14 Regulators use the term alternative investment fund to extend to the broad context of any pooled investment vehicle 
that is privately organized, administered by professional investment managers, and not widely available to the public.” 
See Financial Stability Forum (FSF), Report of the Working Group on Highly Leveraged Institutions, 2000.  However, 
the definition is dated.  See Steve Johnson, US hedge Funds move into ‘Newcits’, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2013, 
https://www.ft.com/content/ca1c625c-fb66-11e2-a641-00144feabdc0. 
15 For instance, Guilio Tremonti, the Italian Finance Minister described hedge funds as "hellish" and demanded their 
abolishment.  See Tracy Corrigan, Hedge Funds Don't Need Punishing - They are Suffering Enough, THE 
TELEGRAPH, Oct. 16, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finanee/comment/tracycorrigan/3212102/Hedgefunds-
dont-need-punishing-they-are-suffering-enough.html. 
16 Returns above the market rate of return are common referred to as Alpha.  See generally CFA INSTITUTE, supra 
note 1, at 86. 
17 Some have argued that Europe will lose a significant portion of its private equity business once the United 
Kingdom exits the EU. However, others have asserted a secondary argument that funds will move to Ireland and 
continue business as usual.  See Michael Collins, Brexit and Private Equity: Why Suspense is Worse Than 




less on developing economies in Europe18 and looking more towards Brazil, Latin America’s 
largest economy.19  This shift is due to a unique set of regulations implemented by the Brazilian 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (hereinafter CVM)) that 
makes Brazil a prime target for any alternative investment fund seeking to operate in an emerging 
market.   
This Comment seeks to accomplish two goals.  First, it seeks to offer a comparative 
assessment of the legal framework governing private equity funds in Brazil and the European 
Union, as well as the regulations United States domiciled investors face when seeking to invest in 
the either of the above jurisdictions.  As this comparative examination will reveal, private equity 
is subject to particularly stringent requirements in Europe, both on a transactional level and, 
subsequent to the adoption of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (hereinafter 
AIFMD), a fund manager level.  It will also show that the European regulatory environment is 
starkly different from Brazil because Brazil, when enacting its regulatory framework, purposely 
took a contrasting approach to make it a desirable jurisdiction for private equity.20  Second, this 
Comment will propose modifications to both Brazil and Europe’s current legal frameworks to 
improve each jurisdiction’s ability to facilitate foreign private equity investments. 
II. History and Explanation of Private Equity 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. (hereinafter KKR) raised the first private equity fund 
to finance leveraged buyouts. Now, private equity firms are the new kings of capitalism.21  Fueled 
 
18 Many Eastern European Nations, such as Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Turkey, are characterized 
as emerging markets. See, e.g., MSCI Emerging Markets Europe Index, Sept. 2018 Report, 
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/1cf0a2d6-48fa-4c69-b397-b0faa3fc6e5c (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).  
19 The World Bank, Latin Am. And Caribbean Econ. Data 2018: Brazil (last visited Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://data.worldbank.org/country/brazil. 
20 See infra parts Part 144.  
21 See GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE D. SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALIST: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND 
THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE 59 (1998). 
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by an abundance of liquidity in the financial system, private equity reached its peak between 2003 
and 2007.22  This golden era ended when the housing bubble burst and the credit crisis emerged. 
These two factors caused the collapse of the private equity market as bidders tried to terminate or 
renegotiate their pending acquisitions.23  Private equity struggled to recover through the early 
2010s.  This struggle was attributed to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe24 as well as fragile debt 
markets.  These factors, along with others, strained deal financing and evidenced the dependency 
of private equity activity on credit market conditions.25  With some of the world’s largest deals 
financed by private equity, however, it arguably has made a full recovery.26  
Since the origins of the modern private equity industry in 1946, there have been four epochs 
marked by three boom and bust cycles.  The early history of private equity, from 1946 through 
1981, is characterized by relatively small volumes of private equity investment, rudimentary firm 
organizations, and limited awareness of, and familiarity with, the private equity industry.27  
The first boom and bust cycle (from 1982 through 1993) is remembered by the dramatic 
surge in leveraged buyout activity financed by junk bonds.  This period culminated with the 
massive buyout of RJR Nabisco before the near collapse of the leveraged buyout industry in the 
 
22 The Economist, The New Kings of Capitalism, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2004, 
http://www.economist.com/sites/default/files/special-reports-pdfs/3398415.pdf. 
23 Matthew D. Cain et al. Broken Promises: The Role of Reputation in Private Equity Contracting and Strategic 
Default 2 (Sept. 11, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1540000. 
24 While some nations in Europe have recovered from the sovereign debt crisis, Italy still faces major issues. In fact, 
Italy’s new budget plan—which has been endorsed by its government—will widen its deficit to 2.4% of Gross 
Domestic Product (“GDP”).  This proposed increase is in defiance of the EU rules.  Giovanni Legorano, Italy’s 
Government Endorses Draft Budget That Would Widen Deficit: Coalition of Antiestablishment 5 Star Movement and 
the Far-Right League Backs Law in Defiance of EU Rules; Full Version Must Now Pass Parliament, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 
15, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/italys-government-endorses-draft-budget-that-would-widen-deficit-
1539636894.    
25 JOHN AUTHERS, EUROPE’S FINANCIAL CRISIS, 155 (2012). 
26 Paul J. Davis, Private Equity: So Hot Even Second-Hand Funds Can Sell at a Premium, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/private-equity-so-hot-even-second-hand-funds-can-sell-at-a-premium-
1529924400.  
27 The Economist, supra note 22. 
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late 1980s and early 1990s.28  The second boom and bust cycle (from 1992 through 2002) emerged 
from the ashes of the savings and loan crisis, insider trading scandals, the real estate market 
collapse and the recession of the early 1990s.29  This period saw the emergence of more 
institutionalized private equity firms, ultimately culminating in the massive Dot-com bubble in 
1999 and 2000.30  
The third boom and bust cycle (from 2003 through 2007) came in the wake of the collapse 
of the Dot-com bubble, at this point in history leveraged buyouts (hereinafter LBOs) reached an 
unparalleled size and private equity was crowned the new kings of capitalism shortly after 
the Blackstone Group's 2007 initial public offering.31  In the early years through to roughly the 
year 2000, the private equity and venture capital asset classes were primarily active in the United 
States.  With the second private equity boom in the mid-1990s and liberalized regulations for 
institutional investors in Europe, however, a mature European private equity market emerged. 
i. How Private Equity Works 
Private equity is a generic term encompassing a wide variety of investments.  The 
customary characteristic of private equity investments is illiquidity since private equity involves 
unregistered securities.32  Private equity includes venture capital, development capital, mezzanine 
capital, LBOs, and distressed investing.33   
Venture capital funds provide financing to start-ups and early-stage firms, thereby 
contributing to macroeconomic growth and job creation.34  Development capital involves the 
 
28 Sarah Bartlett, History of the RJR Nabisco Takeover, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1988, at D15. 
29 The Economist, supra note 22. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 JACK S. LEVIN & DONALD E. ROCAP, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL PRIVATE EQUITY AND ENTREPRENEURIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 1-11 (2017). 
33 Id. at 1–10. 
34 Id. at 1–3. 
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provision of funds to existing companies to support their expansion.35  Mezzanine funds provide 
financing to LBOs in the form of subordinated debt, with equity participation in the form of 
warrants to subscribe for shares in the borrower.36  Distressed debt investors purchase debt of 
troubled companies at a discount, and then use their rights as debtholders to promote a restructuring 
of the company.37 
Private equity investments are channeled through specialized intermediaries that are 
usually organized as limited partnerships, commonly known as private equity funds.38  Private 
equity firms such as KKR, GS Capital Partners, the private equity arm of Goldman Sachs and 
Blackstone periodically establish private equity funds in the form of limited partnerships where 
they serve as general partners.39  The general partner is responsible for managing the fund.  
Furthermore, the general partner solicits capital from investors, who become limited partners of 
these funds.40  The principal investors in private equity funds are generally institutional investors 
such as pension funds, university endowments, insurance companies, and banks.  Wealthy 
individuals, however, have also been known to invest in these funds.41  
III. Private Equity Law in Europe 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, private equity funds and hedge funds have been subject to 
an increase in global regulation,42 even though no study has directly linked the 2008 financial crisis 
to such entities.43  The United States of America became the first nation to pass major financial 
 
35 Id. at 1–7.  
36 Id. at 1–5. 
37 Id. at 1–8. 
38 See GEORGE W. FENN ET AL., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., STAFF SERIES 168, THE ECON. OF THE 
PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET, 28 (1995). 
39 See Alan L. Kennard, The Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX LAW 133, 136 (2003). 
40 See Per Strömberg, The Economic and Social Impact of Private Equity in Europe: Summary of Research Findings 
4 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1429322. 
41 See generally Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 172 (2008). 
42 Yogi Dewan, There are Too Many Hedge Fund Billionaires, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2015. 
43 The famous De Larosière Report dated February 25, 2009, deemed that alternative investment funds (hedge funds 
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market reform that targets private equity funds and other alternative investment vehicles.44  Shortly 
thereafter, the European Commission passed Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament 
and the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives, 2011 O.J. L 
174/1 (hereinafter AIFMD).  The goal of AIFMD was to regulate private equity funds, and other 
investment vehicles, throughout Europe in a uniform and comprehensive manner for the first time 
in the history of the European Union.45  
Prior to Europe implementing the AIFMD, there was no direct European legislation 
regulating Alternative Investment Funds (hereinafter AIFs), including private equity funds.  
Instead, financial service providers were subject to numerous European State regulations that 
aimed to control various aspects of the financial service industry.  Despite the post 2008 European 
Union directives trying to bring uniform regulations to financial markets, a political divide 
emerged between the European member states embracing a market-shaping paradigm and those 
embracing a market-making paradigm.46  The countries adopting the market-making paradigm find 
value in competition, market efficiency and financial innovation.47  Whereas the countries that 
favored the market-shaping paradigm favored investor protection, equal access to the markets, and 
financial stability.48   
 
and private equity funds) didn’t play a major part in creating the crisis. However, they did play a part in worsening it 
by massive selling of shares and short-selling transactions of distressed entities. See JACQUES DE LAROSIÈRE, THE 
HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU 24 (2009). 
44 On July 21, 2010, former President Barack Obama signed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Pub. L. 111–203, H.R. 4173, commonly referred to as Dodd–Frank) into American Federal Law.  
45 Directive 2011/61 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and 
amending Directives, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1 (EC) [hereinafter AIFMD]; See AUTHERS, supra note 25, at 155.  
46 Lucia Quaglia, The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Political Economy of Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union, 34:4 W. 
EUR. POL. 665, 666–82 (2011). 
47 Id. at 667–80. 
48 Id. at 666–79. 
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The United Kingdom and Ireland are the strongest advocates for the market-making 
paradigm, while the market-shaping paradigm received support from the Mediterranean countries 
and, in several instances, Germany.49  In fact, even prior to the financial crisis, the long-standing 
goal of the advocates of the market-shaping paradigm was to regulate private funds.50  Several 
member states instituted national regulatory regimes, which typically involved registration 
requirements and oversight of private equity fund managers, as well as structural separation of the 
fund manager and the custodian.51  Nevertheless, these regulations were fairly rudimentary and 
did not address the complexity of private equity funds.   
The financial crisis gave the EU new momentum in its attempt to regulate private equity 
funds.  Regulators villainized private equity funds that took part in credit default swaps and 
demonized those fund managers who profited from the crash.  But the crisis did not substantially 
alter the configuration of interests concerning private equity fund regulation in the EU.52  Those 
concerns were present and known long before the financial crisis.53  The newfound momentum to 
regulate private equity funds, however, did impinge upon existing regulatory paradigms because 
it was seen as implicitly validating the market-shaping approach exposed by the pro-regulation 
countries.54  European Parliament produced several reports on the rationale for regulating private 
equity funds, and it hinted at the possibility of established parameters as the regulatory atmosphere 
was starting to focus on specific regulations aimed at alternative investment funds.55  
 
49 Id. at 667–82. 
50 Id. at 670–82. 
51 DIRK ZETZSCHE ET AL., THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE 157 (2d ed. 2015). 
52 Id. at 155.  
53 Quaglia, supra note 46. 
54 See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
55 See, e.g., European Parliament, Report of the European Parliament with Recommendations to the Commission on 
Hedge Funds and Private Equity, A6-0338/2008 (2008); European Parliament, Report of the European Parliament 
with Recommendations to the Commission on Transparency of Institutional Investors, A6-0296/2008 (2008). 
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The political motivations of Germany and France, backed by some members of the 
European Parliament, were the driving forces in the redesign of EU regulations on closed-ended 
funds56.  France and Germany’s actions were motivated by institutionally shaped economic 
interests,57 as well as their market-shaping regulatory approach with regards to financial services.  
Further, the global financial crisis also influenced the new regulatory environment because it 
discredited the “British Model”, which was the established regulatory model in the EU since the 
late 1990s.58 
In adopting new financial regulations, the EU followed the redesigned regulatory process 
called ‘Lamfalussy’ approach.59  The ‘Lamfalussy’ regulatory approach is a four-level approach 
to implementing new financial regulations. At level 1, the European Parliament and Council adopt 
the basic laws proposed by the Commission using the traditional co-decision procedure. This 
procedure is usually complex and time-consuming.  Thus, the ‘Lamfalussy’ approach only uses 
level one for setting out framework principles.60 
At level 2, the Commission can adopt, adapt, and update technical implementing measures 
with the help of consultative bodies composed mainly of EU countries representatives.  The three 
European supervisory/consultant authorities that aid in the implementation of new financial 
standards are the European Banking Authority (hereinafter EBA), the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (hereinafter ESMA), and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
 
56 See ZETZSCHE, supra note 51, at 159. 
57 See id. at 159–60. 
58 See id. at 160–62. 
59 See The European Commission, Regulatory Process in Financial Services: Lamfalussy Architecture, (Feb. 10, 2019, 
5:04 PM), https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-reforms-and-their-
progress/regulatory-process-financial-services/regulatory-process-financial-services_it. 
60 Id.  
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Authority (hereinafter EIOPA).  This allows the Council and Parliament to focus on key political 
decisions.61  
At level 3, committees of national supervisors are responsible for advising the Commission 
in the adoption of level 1 and 2 acts and for issuing guidelines on the implementation of the rules.  
The applicable supervisory/consultant authority is charged with drafting both regulatory technical 
standards (hereinafter RTS), which are adopted by the Commission by a delegated act, and 
implementing technical standards (hereinafter ITS), which are adopted by an implementing act.62  
At level 4, the applicable supervisory/consultant authority is charged with ensuring the correct 
enforcement of EU rules by national governments.63   
Under this process, the European Commission may adopt measures as binding technical 
standards that are implemented into law through by the member states.64  The standards set forth 
by the European Commission act as the minimal requirements placed on the member states, and 
individual member states can modify language and impose greater regulations if they choose.  
Regardless, before the European Commission can issue a binding directive on the member states, 
the European Parliament and Council may raise objections to the delegated act and halt the 
legislative process.  
On June 8, 2011, the European Parliament and Council used the Lamfalussy approach to 
pass the AIFMD.65  ESMA is the European supervisory/consultant authority responsible for 




63 Id.  
64 The European Commission is an institution of the European Union, responsible for proposing legislation, 
implementing decisions, upholding the EU treaties and managing the day-to-day business of the EU. 
65 See Generally AIFMD. 
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technical standards for the AIFMD.66  When ESMA’s advisory powers are applied to the AIFMD, 
ESMA has significant control over how the AIFMD is interpreted and applied to the member 
states.  This latitude comes from the highly technical nature of the AIFMD and the broad and 
intentionally ambiguous language of the directive itself.67   
The AIFMD is Europe’s attempt to regulate the private equity industry and create a 
regulatory scheme that applies to all AIF managers conducting business in Europe.  For example, 
it applies to EU AIF managers managing one or more EU AIFs, or non-EU AIFs.  It also applies 
to non-EU AIF managers managing or marketing one or more EU AIFs.  Further, the AIFMD 
applies to non-EU AIF managers marketing non-EU AIFs in the EU.68  The only scenario where 
AIF managers fall outside the scope of the AIFMD is when no relationship with the EU exists, 
such as a non-EU AIF manager managing and/or marketing a non-EU AIF outside the EU.69  The 
AIFMD regulates how an AIF is authorized, and it prescribes the operating conditions of the fund, 
including remuneration requirements, valuation, risk-management requirements, liquidity 
requirements, delegation rules, and depositary requirements.  The AIFMD further places increased 
transparency requirements on AIFs, implements special provisions on leverage, and most 
importantly, controls how an AIF manager can market its fund within the EU and to its citizens. 
The section below will examine the parts of the AIFMD that have the greatest impact on 
Private Equity investing in the EU.  Each of the topics will be examined in detail.  In particular, 
this section will focus on the AIFMD’s marketing requirements, the AIFMD’s anti-asset 
stripping provisions and a few additional restrictions found in the AIFMD.   
 
66 See ZETZSCHE, supra note 51, at 165. 
67 ESMA is very similar to the SEC and FINRA, however it lacks an enforcement mechanism, its sole purpose is to 
promulgate rules.  
68 AIFMD, art. II § (1)(a)-(c). 




i. Marketing Requirements 
First and foremost, investing in any fund that is subject to the AIFMD is only available 
to “qualified investors.”  Each member state makes the determination as to what criteria must 
be met by an investor to be considered a “qualified investor.”70  If a fund subject to the AIFMD 
markets its products or engages in business with an investor who is not deemed a qualified 
investor under the applicable law, the AIF and AIFM may be subject to civil penalties as 
determined by the jurisdiction in which the unqualified investor resides. 
Article 67 of the AIFMD creates the EU wide marketing passport.  Currently, the 
marketing passport is only available to AIFs that are created in the EU and managed by EU 
domiciled managers.  Under Article 67, a European Union domiciled AIF manager must notify 
its home state regulatory agency of its desire to become a passport marketing fund.  This is done 
by filing a notification that includes the following information: (a) The AIF rules; (b) The 
identification of the depository; (c) Information on the AIF which is available to investors, and 
when relevant; (d) Information on arrangements to prevent the AIF from being marketed to retail 
investors.71  
Upon receipt of this information, the AIFs home state may either grant or deny the fund’s 
registration.  If the fund becomes registered, the AIFs’ home state regulatory agency is required to 
send a notification to all other member states certifying that the fund is registered and allowed to 
actively market itself throughout the EU.  This notification must be made within 20 days of the 
 
70 Compare Loi n° 2003-706 du 1 août 2008 de sécurité financière [Law 2003-706 of Aug. 1, 2003 on the Financial 
Security] J.O. 177, Aug. 2, 2003, p. 760 (Fr) (stating to be a qualified investor in France one must have personal 
wealth of at least 500,000 Euro) with European Union (Alternative Investment Fund Managers) Regulations 2013 (SI 
257/2013) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2013/si/257/made/en/print (Article 42 states that an Irish 
professional investor is defined as an investor who demonstrates knowledge and expertise to make investment 
decisions, understands investment risks, and can meet the €100,000.00 subscription requirement).  The terms 
professional investor, qualified investor and institutional investor are used interchangeably depending on the 
jurisdiction.  
71 See AIFMD, art. LXVII (hereinafter AIFMD art. 67).  
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AIFs’ registration.72  After the twenty-day period has lapsed, the AIF can market itself throughout 
Europe and need not register with any other state regulatory agency.73   
Currently, the EU wide marketing passport is only available to EU AIFs with EU AIF 
managers.  ESMA was required to issue an opinion as to whether the AIFMD marketing passport 
should be extended to non-EU AIFs and non-EU AIF managers,74 but this opinion has been 
delayed due to the EU’s negotiations with the United Kingdom regarding Brexit. 75  Based on 
earlier and conflicting ESMA advisory opinions, it is uncertain if the AIFMD marketing passport 
will be extended to non-EU AIFs.76  Article 67 of the AIFMD imposes substantial restrictions on 
how a fund can market itself in the EU.  
ii. Anti-Asset Stripping 
The greatest impact of the AIFMD in the private equity sector has been through its asset 
stripping rules. The rules were designed to restrict the ability of Private Equity Funds to extract 
 
72 See id.  
73 See id.  
74 See id. 
75 See BNP Paribas, Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) - Regulation Memo, Q2 Reg. Memo 
2018 (Mar. 19, 2018), https://securities.bnpparibas.com/insights/aifmd-regulatory-memo-2018.html. 
76 While most experts think it is likely that ESMA will extend the EU-wide marketing passport to non-EU AIFs in 
2018.  See European Securities and Markets Authority, European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the 
Application of the AIFMD passport to non-EU AIFMs, 2016 EMSA MEMO 1140 (Sept. 12, 2016) (indicating that it 
is likely passport marketing will be extended to non-EU AIFs but expressing minor hesitations); See also European 
Securities and Markets Authority, ESMA advice to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the 
application of the AIFMD passport to non-EU AIFMs and AIFs (Jul. 18, 2016) (indicating that it is likely passport 
marketing will be extended to non-EU AIFs but expressing minor hesitations); European Securities and Markets 
Authority, ESMA’s advice to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the application of the 
AIFMD passport to non-EU AIFMs and AIFs (Jul. 30, 2015) (indicating that it is likely passport marketing will be 
extended to non-EU AIFs but expressing minor hesitations); European Securities and Markets Authority, Letter from 
the European Commission to the European Securities and Markets Authority (Dec. 17, 2015) (indicating that it is 
likely passport marketing will be extended to non-EU AIFs but expressing minor hesitations to certain countries 
including the United States and the Cayman Islands).  Due to the power given to ESMA to make decisions regarding 
the AIFMD, it is still not certain if ESMA will extend the EU wide marketing passport to non-EU AIFs.  Even though 
ESMA is required to issue an advisory opinion by 2018, ESMA can say that global regulations and market conditions 
are still not ripe enough to make this determination.  Thereby pushing the possible extension of the EU-wide marketing 
passport to a later date.  
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funds in the first two years of ownership, following an AIF taking control of an unlisted company.77  
Specifically, the rules are (1) the portfolio company is not allowed to undertake any distribution 
(including dividends on shares), capital reduction, share redemption and/or acquisition of own 
shares, (2) the AIF cannot vote in favor of a distribution, capital reduction, share redemption and/or 
acquisition of own shares by the company, and (3) in any event, the AIF should use its best effort 
to prevent distributions, capital reductions, share redemptions and/or acquisition of own shares by 
the company.78 
The rules apply to restrict distributions of pre-acquisition profits—in other words, to avoid 
reducing a company’s value by asset stripping.79  Where a fund is subject to the AIFMD asset 
stripping restrictions, it is imperative to confirm that any planned extractions of funds are permitted 
under the rules.  The obvious circumstances in which this may apply are: (1) Up-streaming cash 
to service debt; (2) Repatriation of cash via regular dividend streams; and (3) Returning cash to 
investors in partial disposals via dividend recapitalizations.80  
In restricting an AIF’s ability to engage in asset stripping, the AIFMD limits the desire for 
distressed debt investors to participate in the European market.81  One of the earliest functions of 
private equity funds is acquiring corporate debt and using the resulting security interests to ensure 
 
77 Control means having over 50% of voting rights in a private company or 30% of voting in a listed company (a 
different figure may apply elsewhere in the EEA). See AIFMD art. XXVI (hereinafter AIFMD, art. 26). 
78 See AIFMD, art. XXX (hereinafter AIFMD, art. 30). 
79 A common practice in private equity is to acquire an undervalued company, and sell off the company’s assets to 
generate a profit for the shareholders. This often occurs when a corporation’s assets are worth more if they are sold 
separately.  Inherent in the AIFMD’s definition of asset stripping is a conflict as to who the new owners have a 
fiduciary duty to.  It seems that the EU is saying the new controlling stakeholder has a duty to preserve a failing 
organization.  
80 See generally CFA Institute, supra note 1.   
81 See Peter Hill, Private Equity Acquisitions - Asset Stripping Rules: It is almost a year since the Alternative 





corporate assets are being used efficiently to create value.82  If the assets the AIF has a security 
interest in are creating losses and the corporation is delinquent in servicing its debt, the AIFM 
would either sell the assets by influencing the board of directors, or foreclose on the debt forcing 
the corporation to sell the assets to repay the AIF.83  The anti-asset stripping provision was put into 
place by the European Commission due to a large number of takeovers that occurred in Eastern 
Europe with the sole purpose of selling the existing company for parts.84  Often, such behavior 
resulted in layoffs. 85 
iii. Disclosure to Investors 
AIFMs must disclose general information to investors regarding the: (1) financial and non-
financial criteria of the remuneration policies; (2) practices for relevant categories of staff to enable 
investors to assess the incentives created; and (3) the requirements in relation to the type of 
information to be made available to investors will generally be information familiar to any 
investment fund managers.86  The AIFMD, however, includes additional disclosure requirements 
such as: (1) Disclosure on insurance coverage for professional liability risks; (2) Details of any 
preferential treatment of investors, the type of investors who obtain such preferential treatment 
and their legal or economic links to the AIF or AIFM; (3) The percentage of AIF assets subject to 
special arrangements due to their illiquid nature and details of the special arrangements; and (4) 
Any changes to the maximum leverage that the AIFM may employ on behalf of the AIF, as well 
as any right of the reuse of collateral or any guarantee granted under the leveraging arrangement.87 
 
82 LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 32. 
83 See generally CFA Institute, supra note 1.   
84 Cf. Nauro F. Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, The Determinants of Asset Stripping: Theory and Evidence from 
the Transition Economies, 49 J. L. & ECON. 681, 681–82 (2006). 
85 See id. at 691–95. 
86 See ZETZSCHE, supra note 51, at 27–30. 
87 See id. at 27–30. 
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iv. Annual Report 
 
The annual report to be provided to investors must comply with disclosure requirements, 
which will generally be familiar to fund managers.  Nevertheless, AIFMs will also be required to 
include additional disclosures including: (1) Any material changes during the financial year; (2) 
The total amount of remuneration paid to AIFM staff for the financial year (fixed and variable) 
number of beneficiaries, and any carried interest; and (3) The aggregate remuneration (broken 
down by senior management and staff of the AIFM whose actions have a material impact on risk 
profile of the AIF).88  While self-evident, an increase in reporting requirements directly correlates 
with the cost an AIFM must spend on compliance and directly impacts the profitability of the 
venture.  
v. Reporting to Competent Authorities  
 AIFMs are also required to provide certain information on a regular basis to the supervisors 
of the member state in which each AIF is marketed.89  The reporting must be in template format 
and include the following:90  (1) The principal markets and instruments traded by it on behalf of 
the AIF; (2) The percentage of AIF assets subject to special arrangements arising from their illiquid 
nature, arrangements for managing liquidity, the risk management systems employed, the current 
risk profile of the fund, the main categories of assets invested in, and the results of stress tests 
performed in line with the AIFM Directive; (3) An annual report of the AIF and upon request, a 
list of all funds managed by the AIFM at the end each quarter; and (4) Where substantial leverage 
is employed, information on the overall level of leverage employed.91 
 
88 See id. at 28–33. 
89 See id. at 45–50. 
90 Commission Regulation 231/2013 of Dec. 19, 2012, Supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council with Regard to Exemptions, General Operating Conditions, Depositaries, Leverage, 
Transparency and Supervision, Annex IV, J.O.  (L 83) 1.  




Leverage is defined in the Directive as: “any method by which the AIFM increases the 
exposure of an AIF it manages, whether through borrowing of cash or securities, or leverage 
embedded in derivative positions or by any other means.”92  
The definition is potentially extremely broad. Clearly, straight cash borrowings of any type 
are included, but leverage will also include (1) convertible borrowings, (2) swaps, options and 
forwards, and (3) repurchasing agreement (repos) and reverse repos93 and securities lending 
arrangements.94  The definition itself does not differentiate between secured and unsecured 
borrowing or on the basis of duration, rates, terms or purpose.95  It is quite possible that private 
fund structures may find themselves employing leverage, whether borrowing for investment, using 
hedging arrangements or perhaps bridging drawdowns.96  The regulatory focus is on exposure.97 
The European Commission’s Delegated Regulation (commonly known as the “Level 2 
Regulation”) expresses leverage as “the ratio between the exposure of an AIF and its net asset 
value.”98  
The Level 2 Regulation requires leverage to be calculated using two bases: (1) the gross 
method—the sum of the absolute values of all positions, so as to give an indication of overall 
 
92 AIFMD, art. IV (hereinafter AIFMD, art. 4). 
93 A repurchasing agreement (repo) is a form of short-term borrowing for dealers in government securities.  In the case 
of a repo, a dealer sells government securities to investors, usually on an overnight basis, and buys them back the 
following day.  Whereas reverse repurchase agreement conducted by the central bank’s Open Market Trading Desk 
(the Desk), also called a “reverse repo” or “RRP,” is a transaction in which the Desk sells a security to an eligible 
counterparty with an agreement to repurchase that same security at a specified price at a specific time in the future.  
See generally LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 32 and CFA Institute, supra note 1.  
94 AIFMD, art. 4. 
95 Id.  
96 See EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND MARKET AUTHORITY, FINAL REPORT: ESMA'S TECHNICAL ADVICE TO THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTING MEASURES OF THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND 
MANAGERS DIRECTIVE (2011). 
97 See id. 
98  Koen van der Veer et al., Developing Macroprudential Policy for Alternative Investment Funds, 202 ECB 
OCCASIONAL PAPER Series 1, 16 (2017). 
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exposure; and (2) the commitment method—the sum of the absolute values of all positions (with 
no setting permitted), adjusted for various factors, including the application of netting and hedging 
arrangements.99  Note, though, that certain types of leverage can be excluded.  There are two 
exclusions that may be particularly important for the private funds sector.  The first exclusion is 
leverage in Portfolio Companies where an AIF’s core investment policy is the acquisition of 
control over non-listed companies or issuers (i.e. most private equity).  Under these circumstances 
the AIFM can exclude any leverage used in making such investments that would otherwise have 
an impact on the maximum leverage requirement prescribed by the AIFMD.100  Additionally, when 
the above set of facts exists in an AIF, neither the AIF nor the AIFM has to bear potential losses 
beyond its investment in the relevant company.101  The second exclusion is Drawdown Facilities 
where an AIFM can exclude temporary borrowing arrangements if they are fully covered by 
contractual capital commitments from investors in the AIF.  Neither of these exclusions, however, 
are completely clear-cut.102 
IV. Private Equity Law in Brazil, The FIP 
Brazilian law does not provide for limited liability partnerships (LLPs) or limited 
partnerships (LPs), and until recently, private equity investments in Brazil were predominantly 
structured through holding companies.  From a legal standpoint, the intensification of private 
equity activity has prompted investors and governmental authorities to devise creative 
transactional structures and regulatory approaches that facilitate private equity ventures and 
manage the demands and challenges of an increasingly competitive market.  
 
99 European Security and Market Authority, Questions and Answers Application of the AIFMD, 1873 ESMA 1, 23–
26 (Dec. 15, 2015). 
100 EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND MARKET AUTHORITY, supra note 96. 
101 Id. 
102 Koen van der Veer et al., supra note 98. 
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The result of this interaction has been instrumental in reshaping the Brazilian Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A) landscape. These classic private equity transactions—formally implemented 
through direct acquisitions/investments or through local holdings incorporated as a limited liability 
company (sociedade limitada)103 or corporation (sociedade por ações (S.A.))104—are now 
gradually making way for structures involving domestic investment funds as the vehicle to acquire 
or invest, hold, and manage portfolio companies until divestment is completed.105 
The most popular private equity vehicle in the Brazilian M&A practice is the FIP, whose 
structure bears some similarity to the partnership fund model generally adopted in the U.S. and 
Europe.  The Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, CVM, introduced FIPs in Brazil 
through Rule No. 391 (CVM Rule 391/03), issued on July 16, 2003.106  By laying down the legal 
and regulatory grounds for the establishment of an investment conduit that local and foreign 
investors formerly lacked when sponsoring private equity ventures in Brazil, CVM Rule 391/03 
largely contributed to a rapid expansion of FIPs in M&A deals.107  More importantly, investments 
 
103 The sociedade limitada is a type of Brazilian business organization that most closely mirrors limited liability 
companies, limited partnerships, and closely held companies under U.S. and U.K. laws.  They are currently the most 
common company found in Brazil, especially due to the flexibility accorded to the structuring of this type of business 
entity and the relatively low level of legal requirements and formalities it is subject to under Brazilian law.  For more 
information on limitadas, see Pinheiro Neto Advogados, Doing Business in Brazil, Vol. 1, Chapter 2 (2010). 
104  The sociedade por ações (S.A.) is a type of Brazilian business organization that is similar to corporations and joint-
stock companies under U.S. and U.K. laws. An S.A. can be publicly or privately held.  A publicly held S.A. and its 
securities must be registered with the CVM, and its securities can be traded on the stock exchange or on regulated 
over-the-counter markets.  The securities of a closely held company are not available to the general public.  For more 
information on S.A.s, see Advogados, supra note 103. 
105 The Brazilian regulatory framework encompasses a profusion of investment fund categories, each tailored to carry 
out investments in a particular asset class.  As far as private equity investment is concerned, the equity funds that can 
be used are typically FIPs, Venture Capital Investment Funds (Fundos de Investimento em Empresas 
Emergentes (FIEEs), focused on start-ups and small targets) and Stock Investment Funds (Fundos de Investimento em 
Ações, rarely adopted in part because of regulatory constraints on portfolio composition). 
106 Instrução CVM [CVM Rule] No. 391, de 16 de julho de 2003, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 18.7.2003 
(Braz.), as amended, (hereinafter CVM Rule 391/03). 
107 After the creation of the FIPs fund structure, accompanied by Moody’s updating Brazil’s government debt rating 
to investment grade in September of 2009, see Public Debt Strategic Planning Department – Investors Relations, 
Brazil Becomes Investment Grade by Moody’s, Brazilian Treasury (Tesouro Nacional) (2009), 
http://www3.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/english/hp/downloads/Nota_Investment_Grade.pdf,  Brazil experienced a 
dramatic increase in M&A activity largely funded by investment funds structured as FIPs.  Cf. Eduardo Paoliello, 
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and exit strategies successfully implemented by FIPs since 2004 created an encouraging track 
record that helped Brazilian private equity-backed M&A transactions achieve high priority on the 
agendas of institutional investors.108  
The regulatory flexibility and generally favorable tax regime accorded to FIPs make FIPs 
a unique and powerful tool for structuring M&A transactions involving targets in Brazil.109  
Additionally, investors can utilize FIPs for fundraising, financing, and implementing exit 
strategies, as applicable CVM regulations allow the placement of their units in the market.110  
CVM Rule 391/03 is the core regulation applicable to FIPs.  The self-contained and 
investor-friendly legal regime applicable to FIPs makes it the preferred and most flexible private 
equity vehicle in Brazil.111  The adaptability of the FIP allows investors to contractually stipulate 
the most suitable set of governing and operational rules that will regulate the FIP and the legal 
interaction as owners of the vehicle.112  These rules are customarily amalgamated in the FIP’s 
charter, quota holders agreements, investment commitment agreements and a variety of service 
contracts that regulate matters bearing on the FIP’s investment policy, decision-making 
procedures, capital commitments and calls, issuance and placement of units (quotas), distribution 
of proceeds, investment and divestment periods, minimum net equity requirements, management 
and performance fees, and liquidation.113 
 
Private Equity 2017: Brazil, in INT’L. COMP. LEGAL GUIDE TO: PRIVATE EQUITY 2017 49 (Oliver Chang et al. eds. 
2017).  
108 Kevin R. Horvath, EMPEA Brief: The Shifting Landscape for Private Capital in Brazil, EMPEA (May 31, 2018), 
https://www.empea.org/app/uploads/2018/05/EMPEA-Briefs_Brazil_FINAL_WEB.pdf. 
109 Paoliello, supra note 107, at 55–57. 
110 Horvath, supra note 108. 
111 See, e.g., João Busin & Jerry de Abreu, The Brazilian FIP: Recent Clarification: What is a Private Equity Entity? 
What are the Tax Consequences of Not Being a FIP?, 25 EMPEA LEGAL AND REG. BULL.  10–11 (2018); Paoliello, 
supra note 107 at 56–57.  
112 See CVM Rule 391/03 
113 This list is not exhaustive but limited to the most common activities regulated by the service contract.  
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i. Form and Ownership Structure 
In essence, the FIP is a collective investment vehicle formed as a condominium, allowing 
co-ownership of assets to be exercised among investors.114  FIPs can only operate in Brazil upon 
registration with the CVM.115  Additionally, the FIPs, along with their securities (quotas) and 
investors (quota holders), are subject to the CVM’s oversight.116  The FIP must be organized as a 
closed-end condominium consisting of an un-personified pool of assets managed and represented 
by an administrator registered with the CVM.117 
The FIP form can be especially attractive to private equity investors seeking lower 
individual exposure to risks through the gathering of funds by an investor pool and asset 
diversification.118  The FIP can also provide its owners with a platform for centralized professional 
management of target companies with the requisite market and financial skills that otherwise 
would not be available to investors acting individually or through subsidiaries.119  Additionally, 
 
114 Under Brazilian law, a condominium can be defined as a joint property (in rem) right exercised by two or more 
persons over a certain asset or pool of assets, each holder (a co-owner or condômino) owning a pro rata fraction of 
such asset. The condominium itself has no legal personality apart from that of its owners, and the Brazilian Civil Code 
(Lei [Law] No. 10,406, de 10 de janeiro de 2002, D.O.U. de 11.1.2002 (Braz.), as amended) sets forth its central legal 
tenets. Statutes and regulations have elaborated on the legal concept of condominium to develop various legal 
structures, such as joint ownership of common areas of residential and commercial buildings and, most importantly 
for the purposes of this Article, quotas (securities) of mutual funds regulated by the CVM. For a further discussion of 
FIP’s quotas. 
115 CVM Regulation No. 325/00 requires all FIPs to register and submit its charter to the CVM.  See Flesch & Prado, 
supra note 105, at 89–90; BUREAU OF ECON., ENERGY, AND BUS. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, 2011 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT – BRAZIL (March 2011). 
116 See generally CVM Rule 391/03. 
117 A close-ended fund (condominium, if the fund is located in Brazil) is an investment vehicle, in which units can 
only be redeemed at the end of the funds’ term, except in the case of liquidation of the fund.  However, distributions 
can generally be made to quota holders throughout the term of the fund and pursuant to its organizational documents.  
See ELROY DIMSON & CAROLINA MINO-PALUELLO, THE CLOSED-END FUND DISCOUNT 1-2 (Bette A. Collins et al. 
eds. 2002). 
118 See generally Fernando J Prado Ferreira & José Paulo Pimentel Duarte, Brazil, in THE ASSET MANAGEMENT 
REVIEW 90 (Paul Dickson et al. eds., LAW & BUS. RES. LTD., 5th ed. 2016). 
119 See supra Part 114 and note 114 and accompanying text (so long as providing the aforementioned services is not 
prohibited by the terms of the service contract, there is no CVM rule or other regulation prohibiting a FIPs from 
engaging in said activity).  
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Brazilian civil and tax law requires the FIP to obtain a federal taxpayer number and to book any 
transactions it undertakes in its own name and on its own behalf.120 
ii. Ownership Rights and Quotas 
Equity units known as “quotas” represent the ownership interest rights of the FIP’s 
investors, or quota holders.121  Each quota in a FIP corresponds to a ratable share of the portfolio 
assets held under joint ownership by the quota holders.122  Thus, the value of each quota is 
calculated by dividing the net equity of the FIP by the number of outstanding quotas.  Each quota 
carries one vote at the quota holders’ general meeting, unless the FIPs organizational documents 
admit classes of quotas with different voting rights.123 
iii. Permitted Investments 
The FIP’s investments are primarily comprised of the acquisition of stock, debentures, 
subscription warranties, or other securities convertible into or exchangeable for stock issued by 
publicly held (listed) or closely held corporations in Brazil whose management must be actively 
monitored by the FIP.124  The remaining portion of the FIP’s portfolio may consist of liquid fixed-
income instruments and other financial assets, mainly for cash management purposes.125  The FIP’s 
charter must establish the eligibility criteria that apply to publicly held companies that the FIP 
invests in.126  
Publicly and closely held corporations are also subject to the minimum set of corporate 
governance standards imposed by CVM Rule 391/03.  Closely held companies that the FIP invests 
 
120  FIPs are also required to register with the National Register of Legal Entities (Cadastro Nacional da Pessoa 
Jurídica (CNPJ)). See Flesch & Prado, supra note 115, at 81–84.  
121 See, e.g., Busin & Abreu, supra note 111, at 10–11; Kevin R. Horvath, supra note 108; Eduardo Paoliello, supra 
note 117, at 55–57.  
122 See, e.g., Busin & Abreu, supra note 111, at 10–12; Eduardo Paoliello, supra note 117, at 55–58.  
123 See Ferreira & Duarte, supra note 118, at 90–93. 
124 See Flesch & Prado, supra note 115, at 81, 84–86. 
125 See id. at 81. 
126 See CVM Regulation No. 325/00; Flesch & Prado, supra note 115, at 81, 89–90. 
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in must comply with certain minimum governance guidelines such as: (1) The establishment of a 
unified one-year term of office for the entire board of directors (no staggered boards); (2) Annual 
audit of their financial statements; (3) Disclosure of related-party agreements, shareholders’ 
agreements, stock option plans, and share buyback plans; and (4) The obligation to adhere to 
certain differentiated levels of corporate governance practices in case the company goes public.127 
If a FIP chooses to invest in either a closely held or publicly held company, the investment 
is not subject to net worth requirements or minimum review.128  Moreover, no mandatory 
diversification requirements or concentration requirements apply to the allocation of the FIP’s 
portfolio, unless the FIPs charter states otherwise.129  Additionally, the FIP can place its entire net 
equity in a single investment or it may distribute its investments over as many targets as it desires, 
so long as the charter is not violated.130  Lastly, there are no restrictions on the number of FIPs that 
can invest in a single entity.131 
iv. Investment Restrictions 
The modalities of investment funding are: (1) The traditional funding132; (2) Mezzanine;133 
and (3) Private investment in public equity (“PIPE”).134  It is the nature of this instrument to 
reinvest capital in new businesses without any distribution of income to shareholders.  The purpose 
is to raise the market value of the asset for a possible sale, either in the promotion of new business 
or in the recovery of illiquid assets.  Its characteristic is illiquidity.135  The CVM rule limits FIP's 
 
127 See CVM Rule 391/03. 
128 José Carlos Junqueira Sampaio Meirelles & Caio Carlos Cruz Ferreira Silva, Brazilian Private Equity Funds 
(FIPS): A DNA Change in Brazilian M&A Deals, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 15, 22 (2013). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 22–23. 
132 Done in the form of capital. JACK S. LEVIN & DONALD E. ROCAP, supra note 32, at 1–10. 
133 Subordinated debt investments, hybrid financing instruments, including debentures convertible into shares or other 
forms and subscription rights.  Id.  
134 Id. 
135 Id.  
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investments in liquid assets to 10% of net equity.136  The remaining 90% must be invested in (1) 
shares, (2) subscription warrants, (3) simple debentures, (4) other securities convertible or 
exchangeable into shares issued by publicly or privately held companies, or (5) titles and securities 
representing participation in limited liability companies.137 
Additionally, The FIP cannot invest in derivatives, except for hedging purposes.138  
Furthermore, only the invested companies that make up the FIP’s portfolio may hold direct 
ownership in real estate assets, not the FIP itself.139  As a result, when FIPs are used as the vehicle 
to invest in real estate, “the invested companies held by the FIP are generally the ones either 
directly holding the real estate assets or investing in Special Purpose Companies (SPCs), which 
will then hold the real estate assets.”140 
The CVM placed some limits on FIPs.  One major limit is that FIPs are not allowed to 
invest in any foreign venture.141  Additionally, the CVM restricts FIPs from soliciting or 
contracting loans (except under very specific limited circumstances) and providing guarantees.142  
Regardless, “holding companies or SPCs that the FIP invests in can be used as vehicles in 
leveraged acquisitions of, or investments in, target companies.”143 
v. Eligible Investors 
Nearly all jurisdictions worldwide recognize that risks associated with private equity 
investments are much greater than investments in public markets.144  Accordingly, nearly every 
 
136 See CVM Rule 391/01 
137 See id.  
138 See CVM Rule 391/03. 
139 See id. 
140 Meirelles & Silva, supra note 128, at 25. 
141 See CVM Rule 391/03. 
142 See id. (except when approved by a qualified majority of 2/3 or more of the quota holders in a general meeting and 
as expressly permitted by the fund’s bylaws). 
143 Meirelles & Silva, supra note 128. 
144 See generally ELROY DIMSON & CAROLINA MINO-PALUELLO, supra note 117. 
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jurisdiction limits private equity investing to qualified investors only145 because the risks 
associated with such investments make them unsuitable for the general public.146  As for FIPs 
specifically, typical risks involve: (a) Illiquidity of the securities and assets making up the FIP’s 
portfolio (as opposed to other investments in more liquid asset classes); (b) Concentration in 
securities issued by only a few target companies or by target companies pertaining to given 
industries or sectors; (c) Failure to comply with the investment policy due to the lack of eligible 
targets; (d) Other risks particularly related to the target companies, including a spectrum of 
business, financial, and legal risks and contingencies; (e) Risks related to the management and 
operation of the FIP; and (f) Market and credit risks.147  CVM Rule 391/03 recognizes the risks 
inherent in private equity investing and limits investment into FIPs to those who are financially 
capable and possess the financial sophistication sufficient to make informed decisions.  
CVM Rule 391/03 sets the FIPs minimum capital commitment per quota holder at 100,000 
Brazilian Reals.  Hence, only “qualified investors” as defined by the CVM, can acquire the quotas 
of a FIP.  This target investor restriction gives investors great latitude in structuring FIPs and 
regulating their operation in accordance with the rules suited for each deal or set of deals.  
Moreover, non-resident investors must make the required investment in accordance with the rules 
 
145 While every jurisdiction has its own definition as to what a qualified (or institutional) investor is, it is widely 
understood that these investors are individuals with high net worth.  See, e.g., LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 32, at 1–3; 
DIMSON & MINO-PALUELLO, supra note 117; Steven M. Davidoff, supra note 41. 
146 In 2001 the definition of “security” changed under Brazilian Law when Law No. 10,303/01 amended 6,385/76 
established a narrow definition of “security”, which only applied to publicly traded entities.  Thus, under the new 
definition and meaning of the term “securities” an investor’s stake in a private equity fund falls outside the scope 
because they are: (1) privately held organizations and (2) investment in a private equity fund is limited to qualified 
investors.  See Marcelo Trindade, CVM, Strategic Challenges for the Investment Fund Industry 11 (March 5, 2012), 
http://www.cvm.gov.br/port/public/publ/seminario/PAINEL01/Marcelo%20Trindade%20-%2 0%20ingles.pdf. 
147 Even though the aforementioned risks are specific to FIPs, the specific risk to FIPs is nearly the same when the 
risk is explored globally.  See, e.g., LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 32, at 1–3; DIMSON & MINO-PALUELLO, supra note 




of Resolution No. 2,689, issued by the National Monetary Council (CMN) on January 26, 2000, 
which apply in addition to the prerequisites of CVM Rule 391/03.148  
vi. Active Participation in the Management of Target 
CVM Rule 391/03 requires the FIP to actively participate in the invested companies’ 
strategic policies and management, notably by appointing members to their boards of directors.  
The requirement to actively participate in the decision-making process of the target companies and 
influence their strategy and management is one of the core features that is unique to FIPs and is 
especially attractive to private equity investors.149  
Under CVM Rule 391/01, the FIP must retain some degree of effective influence in the 
invested companies’ strategic decisions, regardless of how the FIP invests in the target company.  
In order to satisfy the investment eligibility test, the FIP may: (a) Hold stocks that are part of the 
controlling block of the invested company; (b) Enter into shareholder agreements granting it 
discretionary powers over the invested company; or (c) Enter into other agreements or 
arrangements that ensure the FIP’s actual influence over strategic policy and management of the 
invested company.150  
vii. Management and Governance 
In contrast to the partnership structure of many U.S. private equity funds, the 
administration, portfolio management, and distribution of equity interests of a FIP are not 
performed by a general partner. Instead they are performed by an independent legal entity 
accredited with the CVM to engage in securities portfolio administration activities.151  The 
 
148 CMN Resolution 2,689/00 allows non-resident private equity investors to remit funds into Brazil to subscribe for 
and pay in FIPs’ quotas and repatriate their capital abroad. 
149 See generally Ferreira & Duarte, supra note 118. 
150 Agreements or arrangements of this sort can entail, for example, veto rights and supermajority quorums. Cf. CVM 
Rule 391/01. 
151 These entities are known as administrador. See Ferreira & Duarte, supra note 118. 
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administrator is responsible for the legal representation of the FIP as well as for managing the 
FIP’s routine activities, which include paying fees, receiving dividends and interest, preparing 
financial statements and reports, signing shareholder agreements of companies in which the FIP is 
a shareholder, providing reports and information to investors, and other activities established in 
the FIP’s charter or determined by the quota holders’ general meeting.152 
The quota holders who attend the general meeting are the key decision-makers in a FIP and 
have exclusive authority over key matters such as the amendment of the charter, the removal of 
the administrator, the merger or liquidation of the FIP, the issuance and distribution of new quotas, 
the extension of the duration of the FIP, and the operation of the committees and administrative 
bodies of the FIP.153  Resolutions of the general meeting generally require a majority vote of the 
attendees, unless a supermajority vote is mandated by CVM Rule 391/03 or by the FIP’s charter.154  
Certain FIPs also have internal committees and boards to enrich their decision-making processes 
and to ensure informed decisions regarding the FIP’s investments and divestitures.155   More 
complex FIPs might also have advisory boards and technical committees to advise on matters 
pertaining to the industry or sector of each target company.156  
viii.  Taxation of FIP and its Quota holders (PRE Jan. 1, 2018) 
Prior to January 1, 2018, FIPs were generally exempt from income tax generated from 
gains in their financial investments due to the FIP’s classification as a condominium under 
Brazilian law.157  Contrarily, Brazilian tax law did not treat the target companies the FIP invested 
 
152 See id. at 90–95. 
153 Meirelles & Silva, supra note 128, at 22–23. 
154 CVM Rule 391/01. 
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in as tax-transparent, but rather taxed them as independent entities.158  “The fact that the FIP [was] 
per se exempt from taxation on acquisitions and divestitures [made] it a very attractive vehicle for 
private equity investment.”159  Moreover, the exempt treatment was extended to non-Brazilian 
quota holders, which provided an extra incentive for foreign investors to use FIPs as investment 
vehicles when investing in Brazil.160 
In addition, dividends received by the FIP and forwarded directly to the quota holders were 
not subject to the Brazilian withholding income tax (“WHT”).161  Nonetheless, interest on net 
equity received by the FIP and repaid to quota holders as well as other payments made to FIP’s 
quota holders domiciled in Brazil were subject to WHT at the rate of fifteen percent.162  
Nevertheless, “WHT assessed on the income earned by non-resident investors arising from an 
interest in a FIP as well as upon repatriation of the capital originally invested in the FIP are 
currently subject to a zero percent rate, provided that certain conditions are met.”163  The above 
tax treatment given to the FIP prior to January 1, 2018, helps explain, “why foreign private equity 
feeder funds and other non-resident investors usually treat FIPs as the preferred vehicles for private 
equity investments in Brazil.”164  Naturally, “savings from a zero reduction on the WHT levied on 
income distributions made by the FIP may be crucial to determining the economic advisability of 
an M&A transaction and allow private equity investors to maximize the value-capturing potential 
of certain opportunities.”165  
 
158 Meirelles & Silva, supra note 128, at 27–28; see also LAVCA, supra note 157. 
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Franco et al., eds., 2008). 
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ix.  Tax Post 2018166 
The tax benefits found in the FIP changed on January 1, 2018, with the passage of 
Provisional Measure No. 806/2017 (hereinafter “MP 806”), which established new rules regarding 
the taxation of FIPs.  Under MP 806, investors in FIPs qualified as investment entities are now 
taxed via Withholding Income Tax (IRRF) on the sale of assets of the fund, at a rate of 15%.167  
The taxation is based on the grounds of a fictitious distribution of income.168  FIPs not qualified 
as an investment entity (Equity FIPs), are now taxed as legal entities and any earnings and income 
not distributed by January 2, 2018, will undergo the same fictitious distribution and be taxed at a 
15% rate.169  
V. Brazil Offers a More Competitive Landscape for Private Equity Because it Regulated in a 
Manner That Supports Economic Growth by Creating Incentives for Private Investment  
 
When the legal frameworks are compared some similarities become immediately 
apparent.  Consequently, the similarities in the regulations are addressed first, as well as why the 
similarities appear.  A subsequent section will discuss some of the major differences between the 
two legal frameworks and will reach a conclusion as to why the differences exist.  The last section 
will focus solely on the legal frameworks from an investor’s perspective170 and conclude that 
Brazil offers a more favorable regime for Private Equity investing compared to the European 
Union.  
i. The Similarities Between Jurisdictions 
 
166 There are potential Constitutional challenges to the new tax scheme for the FIP but those challenges will not be 
addressed in this Comment.  
167 See Provisional Measure No. 806/2017. 
168 See Luiz Girotto and Tayron Karlos, Provisional Measure No. 806/2017 and the Impacts on Investment Funds, 
GRIROTTO LEGAL MENTORING (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.girottoadv.com.br/en/provisional-measure-no-8062017-
and-the-impacts-on-investment-funds/.  
169 See id. 
170 This analysis will assume the investor is weighing two identical investments with the same risk and return potential 
and is looking solely at the legal framework to determine where to invest.  
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After examining the above legal frameworks, certain similarities exist between Europe’s 
private equity scheme and Brazil’s private equity scheme.  These likenesses share an analogous 
purpose and provide similar protections to the citizens of the respective jurisdictions.  This 
section will first look at the legislative reason behind limiting alternative investing to qualified 
investors and restricting access to such investment vehicles.  Second, this section will look at the 
similarities in the reporting requirements for private equity funds and why these requirements 
exist.  Lastly, the similarities between the European Union and Brazil’s requirements for 
structuring and governing a fund are examined.   
Like most jurisdictions around the world, Brazil and the European Union restrict access to 
alternative investment vehicles and only allow qualified investors to invest.171  While every 
jurisdiction has a different definition of what defines a qualified investor,172 most all governments 
forbid the general public from using alternative investment vehicles.  This is because alternative 
investment vehicles, such as private equity and hedge funds, carry a much greater risk for the 
investor.  Private equity funds derive their risk from their closed-ended structure.173  Close-ended 
funds require investors to commit capital to a fund.  This is referred to in the industry as committed 
capital.  Committed capital may be put towards a so-called blind pool where the investor does not 
know specifically how or where the money is to be invested.  Such an arrangement offers fund 
managers leeway to make investments as they deem appropriate to generate high internal rates of 
return for the investors.174 
 
171 See supra notes 25, 48, 126–128 and accompanying text; See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (defining an accredited 
investor in the United States as “Any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's 
spouse, exceeds $1,000,000 . . . . [or] any natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each 
of the two most recent years or joint income with that person's spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years 
and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year.”). 
172 Compare supra Part 70  and note 70 and accompanying text with Part 144 and notes 144–148 and accompanying 
text. 
173 LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 32, at 1–5. 
174 Id.  
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When a fund pursues investments, such as an offering to acquire a business, the amount of 
committed capital may be seen by the business owner as a way to gauge the ability of the fund to 
follow through with the offer.  As committed funds are called upon to make investments, the 
contributing investors will be granted a portion of the overall returns the investment brings to the 
fund.175  While committed capital does not indicate immediate liquidity, it can demonstrate a 
fund’s capacity to pursue and fulfill deals. 
Put simply, the main reason governments limit the general public’s access to alternative 
investment vehicles is to protect individuals that they deems cannot bear the risk of making such 
an investment.176  The global regulations restricting access to such investment vehicles and 
unregistered security to the “Smart Money”177 is done by excluding the general public from the 
marketplace based on arbitrary standards.  “[T]hese smart-money approaches promote the dual 
goals of capital formation and investor protection.”178  Currently, this approach is being used 
around the world to protect citizens from taking financial risks they may not be able to bear if 
the endeavor fails.  It has been argued, however, that restricting the general populations’ access 
to investment vehicles that generate the highest returns adds to the increasing financial inequality 
in society today.179 Nonetheless, no jurisdiction has taken any action to expand alternative 
investment vehicles to everyone.180  
 
175 Id.  
176 See, e.g., LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 32, at 1–5; ZETZSCHE, supra note 51, at 1–21; Abraham J.B. Cable, Mad 
Money: Rethinking Private Placements, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2253 (2014). 
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Another similarity in the two legal frameworks is the basic reporting and disclosure 
requirements.  It is important to note that the specifics of the reporting requirements make the 
jurisdictions vastly different and will be addressed in the following section.181  
Both Brazil and the European Union require private equity funds to disclose certain 
material information to investors.182  The primary purpose of the disclosure is to make sure the 
fund’s investors have knowledge of any material changes taken by the fund manager or to ensure 
the investors know of any material changes to the fund itself.  Additionally, both jurisdictions 
require funds to report certain information to the appropriate regulatory authorities.183  This is 
done to certify that funds are not engaging in illegal activity.  
Like the “smart money” requirements, the basic reporting and disclosure requirements 
are standard and something every fund manager around the world must understand and adhere 
to.   
ii. Differences Between Jurisdiction. 
While the basic regulatory framework is similar, the laws could not be more different. 
First, when Brazil was enacting the FIPs investment structure, it did so with the intent to 
facilitate foreign private investment.184  Contrarily, the AIFMD aims to restrict foreign 
investment in Europe.185  While these intentions are clear from the effects of the law, it must be 
noted that within Europe there are competing thoughts on what market theory is best between 
nations.186  The European Union is an intergovernmental organization therefore it must act in 
accordance with the majorities wishes.  This is a much greater challenge than governing a single 
 
181 See infra Part 144. 
182 Compare supra Part 70 with Part  144. 
183 Compare supra Part 70 with Part 144. 
184 C.f. supra Part 144.   
185 C.f. supra Part 49.  
186 See supra Part 49 and notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
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state like Brazil because different government must come to an agreement before any change 
may take place.  
Another major difference between the regulations is that Brazil’s FIP program limits the 
type of investments available to foreign private equity investors seeking to do business in 
Brazil.187  In doing so, Brazil sought to insulate itself from many risks presented by the presence 
of foreign capital.188  While investors have bypassed some of the restrictions by using 
subsidiaries and holding companies, such roadblocks do deter some of the potential capital.189  
Europe’s AIFMD contrarily does not restrict the type of investments that investors can make, 
but rather subjects foreign investors to the heightened regulations all European fund managers 
must abide by.190  
 Additionally, another major difference is the extraterritorial nature of the AIFMD.  Like 
many recent European Directives, the AIFMD has an extra territorial effect beyond the European 
Union.  The AIFMD gives protection to all European domiciled investors, and requires 
compliance from all European fund managers operating outside of the European Union.191  The 
extraterritorial aspect presented in the AIFMD is becoming more common among European 
Union regulations and is most present in the AIFMD’s marketing requirements.192  As explained 
above, these rules limit the ability of a fund to market itself to new investors in Europe or to 
investors with European citizenship.  Such extraterritorial reach is not present in the Brazilian 
regulation.193  This is likely due to the size of the market place and the government’s goal of 
 
187 See supra Part 144. 
188 C.f. supra Part 144. 
189 C.f. supra Part 144. 
190 C.f. supra Part 49. 
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192 See, e.g., Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (LI 19), Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID II) and AIFMD. 
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increasing certain types of private investment in Brazil.194  Additionally, Brazil does not impose 
any restrictions on fund marketing, other than the requirement that the fund only takes 
investments from qualified investors.195 
 The final major difference between the regulations is that Brazil grants favorable tax 
treatment to FIP investments.  Prior to 2018, capital gains derived from FIPs investments were 
taxed at 0%.196  This generated greater return for investors and allowed the investment to reach 
alpha in a shorter time frame.197  This favorable tax treatment incentivized investors and lowered 
the risk of FIPs investments in Brazil because the investment did not need to generate as much 
money to create an acceptable return.198  This statement remains true even after the tax law 
changed in 2018.  While the investments are less favorable compared to an identical investment 
at a 0% capital gain tax rate, the new rate (15%) are still reasonable when compared to other 
global tax rates.199  The European Union, unlike Brazil, does not provide any special tax rates for 
private equity investment.  This is likely because to change any tax regulation, the European 
Union must do so by a unanimous vote.200  Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that the European 
Union would ever make any change related to the tax treatment of investment income.  
 As illustrated above, Brazil’s FIPs offers investors a more favorable legal landscape.  The 
law creates a favorable tax rate for the investments and it does not restrict the funds’ ability to 
market itself and find new investors.  Even though the law restricts the types of investment that 
qualify for FIPs, there are means to get around these restrictions.  Thus, the restrictions become 
 
194 C.f. supra Part IV. 
195 C.f. supra Part IV. 
196 C.f. supra Part IV(viii).  
197 C.f. supra Part IV(viii). 
198 CFA INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 86. 
199 See supra Part IV (ix); see also DLA PIPER, GUIDE TO GOING GLOBAL: TAX (2019). 




a slight deterrence, not an all-out bar.  Brazil could make FIPs more appealing to foreign investors 
if it allowed FIPs to invest in real estate development and/or it repealed the 2018 tax changes.  
 If the European Union wants to become a more investor friendly jurisdiction, it should 
consider changing the fund marking requirements and making Passport Marketing available to 
all.  It should also consider reevaluating its standards on the use of leverage.  In almost all 
jurisdictions, funds can use more leverage than what is allowed under the AIFMD.  Allowing 
funds to leverage themselves helps increase the flow of capital into certain investments and 
generates greater returns.  Considering investing in any alternative investment vehicle is 
restricted to qualified investors, making such a change would be consistent with the existing 
provisions.  Lastly, there is no evidence that the 2008 financial crisis was caused by alternative 
investment funds and their use of leverage.  Thus, the imposition of such a drastic restriction 
seems illogical.  
VI. Conclusion 
In conclusion, Brazil, by legislating in a manner that sought to promote private investment 
has created a much more investor friendly jurisdiction when compared to the European Union.  
Additionally, while both jurisdictions could enact changes that would facilitate private 
investing without impacting the investor protection created under the respective regulatory 
frame works, Brazil is in the best position to do so because it already possesses a market making 
mentality, unlike Europe where market shaping has a stronghold.  
 
